So What Have We Learned, and What Have They Not Learned?
The Winston Cup and Craftsman Truck portions of pre-season testing are
wrapped up, and the first page of NASCAR’s aero-matching has been turned.
What has been learned from this session? Several things – despite some Chevy
grumbling, this test was less rancorous than previous sessions, a good sign for
John Darby. The Chevy grumbling was itself a bit humorous, because the test
showed Ford has some work to do – only three Fords cracked the top twenty in
speeds, none in the top seven.
We also learned that Teresa Earnhardt’s Chevrolets, which some have already
given the Harley Earl trophy to, are strong, but are definitely not the fastest
cars. Showing the greatest depth was Dodge – Petty Enterprises bagged the
fastest Dodge lap, while Ray Evernham’s #19 of Jeremy Mayfield made the biggest
gains after a poor start to the test; Ganassi/SABCO Racing were all strong, and
Ken Schrader proved that putting a real race driver in the car will get
Elizabeth Morgenthau’s #49 competitive.
The big story from Dodge’s camp came from newcomers Ryan Newman and Rusty
Wallace, both stout off the truck, both consistently stout throughout their
tests. Rusty was particularly good in the draft.
The Dodge team scratching their head was Bill Davis Racing; Ward Burton was
disappointed in his test session, despite being 26th fastest, hardly out of any
contention, and with a good run in the drafting session.
The driver with the most to prove in the Dodge session is Jimmy Spencer, 27th
overall and driving for a team whose sponsor may be in some jeopardy.
We also learned that Pontiac clocked off very good laps – Mike Skinner was
second-fastest overall in Morgan-McClure’s Pontiac, and Ricky Craven is well
along to become the first team in recent memory to switch from Ford to GM and
not die off because of it. Ashland Oil’s two-car team also had a productive test
– Johnny Benson was 22nd and Jerry Nadeau a deceptively slow 39th.
Chevrolet of course has dominated the plate tracks since July 1988 at
Talladega, winning 38 races to Ford’s 17. Teresa Earnhardt’s Monte Carlos timed
5th, 11th, and 24th, and Mikey Waltrip was bold enough to appear on FOX’s NFL
broadcast to boast of his chances of winning the 500 again – and how many of us old-timers
ever thought we’d see THAT?
Richard Childress, meanwhile, had a decent session, but appeared to lose some
punch the longer the session went, particularly with Robby Gordon’s #31, only
41st on the speed chart and never really able to improve much. Jeff Green was
23rd on the chart but was unhappy with his car’s weakness in the draft.
Joe Gibbs showed some remarkable muscle for Bobby Labonte after his poor 2002
season; Labonte rocketed to 7th overall while Tony Stewart was 21st.
The outnumbered Ford squad was led by Yates Racing, 8th with Elliott Sadler
and 17th with Dale Jarrett. Mark Martin (20th) was fastest of the Roush Fords
while Kurt Busch (29th) was the most consistent. Matt Kenseth, stout on the
plate tracks all last year, looked competitive again though was only 37th quick,
and Jeff Burton (34th) picked up considerably over his session.
By far the slowest of the Roush Fords was Greg Biffle, abysmal all week and
in the 500’s DNQ dead pool right now, with no speed and no provisionals to burn.
Looking decent during the session was Ricky Rudd, in the Wood Brothers #21,
reunited with Motorcraft, his sponsor 1985-7.
There was talk of sandbagging, with some teams running without tape on their
grilles, etc. The talk, though, may have to shift to who ran faster than they’re
really capable of. Much has been made of how Mike Wallace’s Phoenix Racing #09
Dodge finished third in the 2002 500 when it was a Ford; little has been
mentioned of how that run was better than the team really deserved. The Phoenix
team was poor in qualifying and got black flagged early in the 125, barely
getting into the 500 on speed; they finished third more to attrition than to
passing people, though the car certainly did run well. Mike Wallace was the only
driver to hit 184 in testing, but that may be a run better than the team really
is.
Definitely suspicious were the fast times of #60 David Green and #0 Jack
Sprague, who were slow all week and suddenly burst out in the final session and
clocked superb speeds. Both ran Hendrick cars (Sprague’s chassis and engines are
Hendrick), and to come out at the end and pick up as much as they did was quite
striking.
So what did we learn overall? That Dodge and Chevrolet are strong, that
Pontiac is good, and that Ford is a bit behind. How will this translate to the
race? Given how many NASCAR inspectors were on hand, the speeds turned in
qualifying should be pretty consistent with what was run in the test. The
drafting session showed some passing and some sustained side by side racing, but
it is still far too early to gauge the effect on the draft that the
aero-matching and NASCAR’s equal-weight rule (requiring the nose section and
tail section to weigh exactly the same) will have.
And with the aero issues of Speedweeks came the overall aero-push issue of
the whole sport, and the renewal of discussion shows how little people seem to
have learned.
"We’ve basically put no effort toward improving the opportunity to pass
for five years."1
So said Mark Martin during the last day of the test. "There was a problem
growing and it has grown and grown and grown….a grippier tire and less aero is
no question the right way to go, but that won’t fix it. I will tell you in the
early 1990s there was no such thing as aero push. Let me put it this way, I
never felt it in the early 1990s."
But like Martin, I remember the early 1990s, and before that as well, and
contrary to Martin, there WAS an aero push before the mid-1990s – it just wasn’t
called such until now. It was apparent in the debut of GM’s bubble-glassed
Chevrolet and Pontiac of 1986-8, cars that initially so porposed the noses off
the ground that extensive wind tunnel testing was needed to correct the problem.
It was also apparent in the early 1990s as cars started porposing off the ground
due to bigger spoilers, a problem rather quickly corrected.
The aero push has long been there, but was not identified as such. And the
problem of inability to pass long predated the debut of Chevrolet’s W-body Monte
Carlo of 1995, the real beginning of the down force era. Inability to pass was a
common issue by 1991 with cars that by today’s standards had zero down force and
extremely soft tires.
John Darby addressed the issue and noted that the speedways themselves are a
factor: "Some of the tracks are more down force dependant than others and
we have to work through that as well."2
That is a start of sorts, for it acknowledges that racecars cannot race
without down force. But until the sport comes to grips with what is really wrong
in the aero push issue, the proposed changes will not help matters.
Rusty Wallace has long championed cutting rear spoilers and going back to
soft tires, saying he can’t stand it that cars can stay out for 200 laps without
pitting – "You hit pit road, put four tires on and get that real grippy
feeling for six or eight laps before the tires start bleeding off – I think
that’s what it’s all about."3
Rusty obviously is not thinking with his wallet. Four tires means higher tire
bills – with tires where teams don’t have to pit for fresh rubber, tire bills
inevitably shrink. If Rusty wants that grippy feel, then the tires should be
widened by an inch or more – the hardness needs to stay, because the sport has
to get away from these expensive (and dangerous) tire stops as best it can.
And those who advocate reduced spoiler size for better racing display an
oblivious attitude in remembering when the sport had less down force and softer
tires. Again, passing was no easier then than now, but the sport was more lethal
then. Those who push for less down force neglect to mention one of the critical
reasons why down force was increased – because of the epidemic, in the 1980s to
latter 1990s, of aero-loose melees. Cars regularly lost air on their spoilers,
the back of the affected car was sucked out from under the driver, and the car
spun hard into the wall, usually taking another car with it.
Among the races heavily affected by aero-looseness were the 1992 Dixie 500,
The Winstons of 1994-6, the 1995 Michigan 400, the 1995 Grand National World 300
at Charlotte, the 1998 Carolina 400, ’98 World 600, and ’98 National 500. It was
such an issue that in the mid-1990s NASCAR even warned drivers not to race side
by side through Charlotte’s corners. Counters that mechanical grip can
compensate for loss of down force do not hold water due to this past history and
to the dramatic reduction in aero-loose crashing as a result of increased down force.
And part of the rationale for less down force ignores how passing was done –
most passing wasn’t done by loosening the leader out of the groove, it was done
by drafting past entering or through the corner, and the draft greatly helped
air-off-the-spoiler passing as well. Mark Martin inadvertently touched on this
by mentioning, "We’ve had a perfect example by looking at Indy cars."
Indy cars solved their passing problem by addressing the real issue – the
weakness of the draft. CART’s Hanford wing was by far the most successful change
ever seen there, and IRL’s bulkier aero bodies make a much better draft and make
side by side racing so much more sustained.
NASCAR of course had its own Hanford wing in the roof spoiler, a device that
would solve the aero push issue better than lower down force ever could. NASCAR
and its drivers need to think more before making the same mistake for the third
time in a span of ten years.